




For more than thirty years, supporters and critics of insider trading
regulation have agreed on one thing-that insiders can beat the market
simply by using nonpublic information to decide when not to trade. This
shared belief has influenced scholarship on both sides of the insider trading
debate. It has led certain proregulation commentators to argue that insider
abstention is as unfair as insider trading and that, ideally, both should be
restricted. Opponents of insider trading regulation, on the other hand, have
cited insiders' unfettered ability to abstain on nonpublic information to
support one of their main claims-that any attempt to "level the playing
field" between insiders and the public is bound to fail. This Essay explains
why the conventional wisdom about insider abstention is wrong. It shows
that when insiders cannot trade while in possession of nonpublic
information, their ability to abstain based on such information does not
enable them to outperform public shareholders. The Essay also explains
why insider abstention is much less likely than insider trading to distort
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managers' incentives, and might, even improve them. The Essay concludes
by describing the implications of its findings for a number of issues in
insider trading regulation.
Insider trading continues to attract a considerable amount of attention
from economists,' legal academics, 2 the media, 3 and government agencies
4
around the world. Although academics still debate the economic desirability
of insider trading, the consensus among the American public, Congress, and
the SEC is that insider trading is "unfair" and erodes investor confidence in
the market. This consensus has given rise to a set of insider trading laws
that attempts to preserve investor confidence in the market and level the
playing field between insiders and public shareholders.5
The primary mechanism for regulating insider trading is the duty to
"disclose or abstain," which arises under Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities
6Exchange Act of 1934. Under the duty to disclose or abstain, a person in
knowing possession (or "aware") of material nonpublic information must
either disclose the information or abstain from trading when the other party
to the transaction is entitled to know the information because of a fiduciary
duty or other relationship of trust and confidence between them.
Although Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits insiders from trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information, it does not prohibit them
from using such information to abstain from trading. Thus, in certain cases
Rule 1Ob-5 permits insiders to use material nonpublic information to their
advantage. For example, a manager of ABC Corp. considering selling ABC
shares on Monday afternoon learns, shortly before the planned sale, that
1. E.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN.
75 (2002).
2. E.g., Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235
(2001); Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313
(2002).
3. E.g., William Lerach & Al Meyerhoff. Editorial, Why Insiders Get Rich, and the Little Guy
Loses, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at M2 (discussing stock sales by executives at Enron, Oracle,
Cisco, and Sunbeam before their companies' stocks plummeted); Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle,
Enron Insiders Cashed In $1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al ("[S]ome
shareholders and lawmakers are setting their sights on . . the millions that Enron insiders
received by selling their shares while the price [of Enron stock] was still high.").
4. See. e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 63, 65-66 (2002) (describing the dramatic increase in the number of nations
adopting insider trading laws during the 1990s).
5. See infra Section Ll.B.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30
(1980) (interpreting Rule 1Ob-5 to impose the duty to "disclose or abstain").
7. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225-30. The SEC has ruled that an insider subject to Rule lOb-5
violates the rule by trading "on the basis of material nonpublic information" and has defined a
trade "on the basis of' material nonpublic information as one made while "the person making the
purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information." § 240.10b5-I(b). In Section
IV.A, I examine an alternative version of Rule 1Ob-5 under which an insider violates the rule only
if she uses material inside information in her decision to trade, and I consider how this "use"
standard changes the analysis. Until then, however, I assume that the SEC's "knowing
possession" or "awareness" standard is in effect.
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there is undisclosed good news. That news, to be disclosed Tuesday, is
likely to boost ABC's stock price. The manager abstains from selling the
stock for $10 on Monday and instead sells on Wednesday, after the good
news has boosted ABC's stock price to $12. A similarly situated public
shareholder, ignorant of the impending good news announcement, sells his
stock on Monday afternoon for only $10 per share, receiving $2 less per
share than the manager.
Because of this "abstention problem," many legal commentators-
including both supporters and opponents of insider trading regulation-
have concluded that even insiders unable to trade while aware of nonpublic
information could still reap greater trading profits than public shareholders.
This reasoning has led Henry Manne and other critics of insider trading
regulation to argue that insiders' ability to abstain on nonpublic information
makes regulating their use of nonpublic information essentially 
futile.8
Those wishing to level the playing field between insiders and public
shareholders share Manne's view that insider abstention gives insiders an
advantage. For a number of these commentators, however, insider
abstention is not an embarrassing gap that casts doubt on the entire
enterprise of regulating insiders' use of private information, but rather is an
undesirable loophole that can be closed, at least in certain circumstances.
One commentator has discussed the possibility of either reading Rule 1 Ob-5
expansively to ban insider abstention, or enacting a new statute targeted
specifically at insider abstention. 9 In most cases it would be difficult to
prove that an insider used nonpublic information to abstain from trading.
Such evidence might be available, however, if the insider indicated, in
writing or in conversation, an intent to buy or sell, and then subsequently
did not trade after receiving nonpublic information indicating that the trade
would be unfavorable.' 0
The main purpose of this Essay is to show that the conventional view of
insider abstention is incorrect. Using a simple model, I demonstrate that an
insider unable to trade while in possession of nonpublic information cannot
systematically earn higher trading profits than a similarly situated public
shareholder by using nonpublic information to abstain from trading. As this
Essay explains, insider abstention merely compensates the insider for his
inability to trade while in possession of nonpublic information that indicates
such a trade would be favorable. In fact, an insider prevented from both
trading while in possession of nonpublic information and abstaining on
8. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information,
4 CATO J. 933, 938 (1985).
9. Stephen R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility, Noninformational Tippee Trading, and Abstention
from Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider Trading Laws, 68 WASH. L. REV. 307, 333-34
(1993).
10. 1 discuss the issue of regulating insider abstention further in Part IV.
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such information would earn lower trading returns than a similarly situated
public shareholder, all other things being equal.
To be clear, I am not asserting that insiders are now prevented from
trading while in possession of nonpublic information. Indeed, I have argued
elsewhere that currently insiders are not always deterred from trading on
"material" nonpublic information. " In addition, they are permitted to trade
on various types of private information that are valuable but not considered
legally "material."' 2 Nor do I wish to argue here that insiders easily can be
prevented from trading on nonpublic information.' 3 Rather, my claim is that
if insiders are unable to trade while aware of nonpublic information, their
ability to abstain from trading on such information does not give them an
advantage over public shareholders. In other words, parity between insiders
and public shareholders can be achieved even if insiders remain completely
free to engage in insider abstention. The Essay also briefly considers the
effects of insider abstention on managers' incentives. While a complete
study of these effects is beyond the scope of this Essay, a preliminary
analysis suggests that insider abstention is much less likely than insider
trading to distort managerial behavior, and might even improve managers'
incentives.
I then turn to examine two important policy implications of this
analysis. The first implication relates to the longstanding "possession versus
use" debate under Rule 1Ob-5. The SEC has ruled that a person trades in
violation of Rule 1Ob-5 if he is in "knowing possession" (or "aware") of
material nonpublic information when the trade is executed. Some
commentators have argued that there should be no violation of Rule 1Ob-5
unless the insider "uses" the nonpublic information in deciding whether to
trade. The analysis offered in this Essay shows that the SEC's "knowing
possession" standard creates a more level playing field between insiders
and outsiders than does the "use" standard. The second implication relates
to the SEC's safe harbor from Rule lOb-5 liability for insiders executing
trades according to prearranged trading plans. Using this Essay's findings, I
explain why the SEC's safe harbor allows insiders to profit from material
nonpublic information and how it could easily be modified to prohibit
insiders from profiting from such information.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that there are various types of
"insiders"-persons who receive nonpublic information bearing on the
value of publicly traded securities: For example, there are "corporate
11. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through
Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 331-35 (1998).
12. See id. at 335-37.
13. In previous work, however, I have explained why requiring corporate insiders to disclose
the details of their trades in advance would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the ability of
insiders as a group to trade profitably on inside information. See id. at 348-72.
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insiders," the executives and directors of a firm who acquire nonpublic
information about the firm through their positions in the corporation;
"temporary insiders," the firm's lawyers, accountants, and bankers who
acquire such information while providing services to the firm; and
"tippees," persons who receive nonpublic information from other insiders.
Although the examples and model in this Essay feature a corporate insider,
the analysis of that insider's trading returns would apply to any person with
nonpublic information about the value of a publicly traded firm's shares.
Thus, any insider who is unable to trade while in possession of nonpublic
information cannot expect to beat the market by abstaining on such
information.
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
nature of insiders' informational advantage over public shareholders. It then
explains how Rule lOb-5 reduces insiders' ability to exploit this advantage
by prohibiting insiders from trading on material nonpublic information. Part
III uses a simple model to examine the distributional effects of insiders' use
of nonpublic information to abstain from trading, a use of inside
information permitted by Rule lOb-5. The model demonstrates that an
insider who is prevented from trading while in knowing possession of
nonpublic information, but who is free to abstain from trading based on
such information, cannot systematically beat the market. It also shows that
an insider unable to trade or abstain while aware of nonpublic information
will underperform the market. Part III ends by explaining why insider
abstention is less likely than insider trading to distort managers' incentives.
Part IV discusses the implications of the analysis in Part III for the
longstanding "possession versus use" debate under Rule lOb-5 and the
regulation of insider selling plans. Part V concludes.
11. INSIDERS' INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE AND THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
A. Insiders Informational Advantage
Consider the CEO of a publicly traded firm. From time to time, the
CEO's position will provide her access to nonpublic information bearing on
the value of the firm's stock. This inside information might indicate that the
stock price is likely to increase. For example, the CEO might learn before
the public that last quarter's earnings were better than expected, that there
will be an unanticipated takeover bid, that there has been a significant
technological breakthrough, or that an important new customer has been
acquired. Alternatively, the inside information could indicate that the stock
price is likely to fall. The CEO might learn before the public that earnings
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are worse than expected, that a key product has failed, or that impending
litigation against the firm is likely to reduce significantly the firm's value.
If permitted to trade freely on nonpublic information, insiders could use
it to their advantage. When there is undisclosed good news, insiders can
buy stock before the information is released and benefit from the
subsequent appreciation. For example, suppose that the CEO of ABC Corp.
learns that earnings will exceed expectations and that the release of the
information will likely boost the price of the stock, now trading at $10 per
share, to $12. The CEO could use this information to make a profit of $2
per share.
When there is undisclosed bad news, insiders can sell the stock before
the price falls. For example, suppose that the CEO of ABC Corp. learns that
earnings will fall short of expectations and that the release of the
information is likely to cause the price of the stock, now $10, to drop to $8.
By selling the stock now rather than waiting until the bad news is released,
the CEO could make a profit (by avoiding a loss) of $2 per share.
B. The Prohibition Against Insider Trading
Although persons with nonpublic information have an advantage over
other shareholders, for more than sixty years there has been a consensus
among the public, Congress, government regulators, and many
commentators that insiders should not be permitted to profit freely from this
advantage. 14 The consensus is reflected in a system that attempts to level
the playing field between insiders and public investors. The primary
mechanism for regulating trading by insiders is the duty to "disclose or
abstain," which arises under Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act. 
1 5
14. See, e.g., Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., ABA, Report of the Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading-Part I. Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 227-28 (1985) (concluding that the "fair
play" basis for the regulation of trading by corporate insiders is still sound after fifty years); see
also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The
Ethics ofInsider Trading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 123; Alan Strudler & Eric
W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999).
15. Insider trading is subject to other federal restrictions as well. Rule 14e-3 under the 1934
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003), imposes a duty to disclose or abstain on a person who receives
material nonpublic information about a tender offer that originates with eithcr the offeror or the
target. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 9 (1996). Section
16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000), bans short-swing profit taking by corporate
insiders. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra, § 15. Section 16(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(c), forbids short selling by corporate insiders. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra, § 15.1. In
addition, a variety of federal criminal statutes, such as RICO and the mail and wire fraud statutes,
have been invoked to enforce Rule lOb-5. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION § 8.04 (1989); WANG & STEINBERG, supra, § 11. There are also state corporate law
restrictions on trading by insiders. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra, § 16. State insider trading law
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Rule l0b-5, which was promulgated by the SEC in 1942, does not
expressly prohibit insiders from trading on inside information. In 1961,
however, the SEC interpreted Rule lOb-5's prohibition against "any act,
practice, or course of business which operates... as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' 6 to
impose the duty to disclose or abstain.' 7 According to the SEC,
[T]he obligation [to disclose or abstain] rests on two principal
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.'
8
Under the duty to disclose or abstain, a person in possession of
"material" 9 nonpublic information must either disclose the information or
abstain from trading when the other party to the transaction is entitled to
know the information because of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of
trust and confidence. 20 The rule applies to corporate insiders trading in their
largely has been supplanted, however, by federal law. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW § 8.2, at 265, § 8.8, at 306-09 (1986).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(c).
17. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) ("[I]nsiders must disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.... [If disclosure
would be] improper or unrealistic ... the alternative is to forego the transaction.").
18. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted). The duty to disclose or abstain was later adopted by the
Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), and was
acknowledged implicitly by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980), which conditioned the duty on the existence of a fiduciary or other special relationship
between the parties involved in the transaction.
19. In Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second Circuit held that "material" facts are those to
which a "reasonable man would attach importance... in determining [whether to buy or sell
shares]." 401 F.2d at 849 (internal quotation marks omitted). In interpreting the term "material"
under a related statute, the Supreme Court provided a similar definition. See TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that under Rule 14a-9, the general antifraud
provisions of the SEC's proxy rules, an omitted fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote"). More
recently, the Court has indicated that the purpose of the materiality standard is "to filter out
essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would not consider significant ... in
making his investment decision." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988). As 1 explain
shortly, however, the lower courts continue to interpret "materiality" in a manner that enables
insiders to profit legally on certain kinds of valuable nonpublic information.
20. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230-31. The information must indicate that the intended trade
would be favorable to the insider. An insider is free to trade while in possession of nonpublic
information indicating that the trade would be unfavorable to him. Under the misappropriation
theory, the duty to disclose or abstain also applies to a fiduciary who uses inside information
belonging to his principal to make trading profits: the fiduciary must either disclose his use of the
information to the principal or abstain from trading. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
652 (1997).
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firm's shares because they are considered to owe a fiduciary duty to public
shareholders. 2' During the last twenty years, Congress has sharply increased
penalties for violating Rule lOb-5.22 There is evidence that these measures
have reduced the amount of illegal insider trading.
23
It is worth noting that although Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits insiders from
trading while in possession of "material" nonpublic information, it might
not always prevent them from doing so. 24 Despite the adoption of tougher
penalties, there still could be situations in which the probability of
apprehension and punishment is too low to deter illegal trading.25
Moreover, trial courts have been reluctant to find information "material"
unless it concerns a "bombshell event"26-such as the definite existence of
a takeover offer-whose announcement causes the stock price to move very
sharply in one direction or the other.2 7 Thus, even if Rule 1 Ob-5 could deter
insiders from engaging in illegal insider trading on material nonpublic
information, it would still allow insiders to trade while in possession of
important but "sub-material" nonpublic information.28
For purposes of this Essay, however, these enforcement and materiality
gaps in Rule 1Ob-5 are not important. The Essay's claim is that if these gaps
were closed, and insiders therefore could not trade while in possession of
nonpublic information, the insider abstention permitted by Rule lOb-5
would not enable insiders to beat the market. Thus, in analyzing insiders'
trading returns under a regime where insiders cannot trade while in
possession of nonpublic information, I assume that (1) the prohibition is
enforceable and (2) it applies to all nonpublic information indicating that
the shares are worth more or less than the market price. As we will see,
such a regime creates a completely level playing field between insiders and
public shareholders when insiders remain free to abstain on nonpublic
information.
21. The rule also applies to controlling shareholders, who are considered to owe fiduciary
duties to public shareholders even though their legal relationship with the public shareholders is
not the same as that of the corporation's employees. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 15, § 3.02,
at 72.
22. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 15, § 7.3.3.
23. See Fried, supra note 11, at 310.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 332-35; Manne, supra note 8, at 937 (noting that the "ability to detect [insider
trading] will always be difficult, and when the gains that can be realized from the practice,
discounted by the risk of being apprehended, are compared to the potential costs, many people
will have the incentive to trade on inside information").
26. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 886-87 (1983).
27. See Fried, supra note 11, at 335-37.
28. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 26, at 886-87; Fried, supra note 11, at 335-37.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER ABSTENTION
Having examined Rule 1Ob-5's prohibition against insider trading, we
are now ready to consider the implications of insiders' ability, under Rule
lOb-5, to engage in insider abstention. The first four Sections of this Part
focus on the distributional effects of insider abstention. Section A describes
the received wisdom on the subject-that even if insiders are unable to
trade while in possession of nonpublic information, they can earn higher
returns than public shareholders simply by using nonpublic information to
decide when not to trade. Section B offers a numerical example to explain
why the received wisdom is incorrect. Section C then uses a simple formal
model to demonstrate that insiders prevented from trading while in
possession of nonpublic information cannot outperform public
shareholders. The model also shows that insiders prevented from both
trading and abstaining while in possession of nonpublic information would
systematically underperform public shareholders. Section D shows that the
model's results are robust under different assumptions about the flow of
nonpublic information to insiders. Section E offers a preliminary efficiency
analysis of insider abstention.
A. The Conventional Wisdom
In Section II.B, I explained that Rule lOb-5's disclose-or-abstain
requirement does not completely prevent insiders from trading profitably on
nonpublic information. Legal commentators have long assumed, however,
and in many cases have affirmatively argued, that even if insiders were
unable to trade while in possession of nonpublic information, they could
still beat the market by using nonpublic information to abstain from
trading.29
29. In 1974, Henry Manne wrote:
[I]t is very difficult to prove that a person benefited from undisclosed information when
all he did was raise his reservation price and not sell at the old price. Yet it now seems
apparent that this form of insider "trading" may be more common than the type in
which a person seeks to buy shares. The economic effect, in any event, is the same ....
Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Law, in
WALL STREET IN TRANSITION 21, 78 (Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974). This view
has persisted in the literature until this day. See, e.g., Boyd Kimball Dyer, Economic Analysis,
Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1, 23-24 (asserting that "[p]rohibiting
insider trading.. . does not prevent an insider from obtaining an advantage from inside
information by 'not trading,"' and that "[t]he problem of 'insider not trading' is not solvable");
Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in
EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 39, 48 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991) (asserting
that by postponing liquidity trades insiders can earn excess returns); Saul Levmore, Securities and
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117, 119 (1982) (arguing that
"requiring outsiders to take investment risks blindly-while knowledgeable insiders avoid these
risks by abstention-may be as unfair as allowing insiders to trade as they wish"); Saikrishna
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
The example presented in the Introduction can be used to illustrate
these commentators' thinking. Suppose that the CEO of ABC Corp. intends
to sell one million shares Monday afternoon. On Monday morning, several
hours before the planned sale, the CEO learns that last quarter's earnings
are substantially higher than expected. The stock is trading at $10 per share.
The earnings announcement, to be released Tuesday, is likely to cause the
market price to increase significantly. The CEO abstains from selling until
the earnings are released.30 The earnings are released on Tuesday, boosting
the stock price to $12. The CEO then sells her one million shares for $12
each on Wednesday, receiving a total of $12 million.
Compare the abstaining CEO to a similarly situated public shareholder
who also intends to sell one million shares for $10 on Monday afternoon
but lacks the same inside information. Unaware that the stock price is likely
to increase Tuesday, the public shareholder does not abstain from selling
the stock on Monday. Instead, he sells his shares for $10 per share Monday
afternoon, receiving a total of $10 million. Inside information thus enables
the CEO to make $2 million more than the similarly situated public
shareholder. The CEO does not violate Rule lOb-5, however, because the
CEO is not trading while in possession of inside information. She is
abstaining on inside information, and trades only once the information has
been released and has become reflected in the stock price.
Not surprisingly, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
insiders use nonpublic information to abstain from unfavorable trades. For
example, insiders of over-the-counter (OTC) listed firms who know their
shares will be listed shortly on the NYSE or AMEX postpone sales until
after the relisting announcement. 3' Insiders reduce their sales after receiving
Prakash, Our Dysftmctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1503 n.53 (1999)
(remarking that insider abstention enables an insider to use her informational superiority to her
advantage). Judge Richard Posner also had argued that abstention creates a loophole from which
insiders can systematically benefit. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
§ 14.10, at 459-60 (5th ed. 1998). Judge Posner subsequently accepted my analysis after reading a
working paper of this Essay, and he cites that working paper in the most recently published
edition of his work. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.10, at 434 n.3
(6th ed. 2003). In the course of discussing other issues in insider trading, two articles, one by
myself and one by Mark Klock, briefly questioned the received wisdom on insider abstention. See
Fried, supra note 11, at 337-40; Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for
Prohibiting Inside Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 332-33 (1994). But neither provided a
systematic analysis of the subject.
30. In certain cases, a CEO wishing to sell stock might be able to accelerate the
announcement instead of waiting for the good news to be released at the originally scheduled
time. This would enable her to sell the shares earlier. There are likely to be cases, however, in
which the information cannot be released early. For example, the information might not be
compiled completely yet, or competitive reasons might require that the announcement be delayed
until a particular date.
31. See, e.g., Asjeet S. Lamba & Walayet A. Khan, Exchange Listings and Delistings: The
Role ofInsider Information and Insider Trading, 22 J. FIN. RES. 131, 144 (1999).
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advance notice of an imminent leveraged buyout offer.32 Managers also sell
heavily after making stock-price-boosting earnings forecasts, and buy
heavily after making stock-price-depressing earnings forecasts.33 Generally,
insider selling tends to take place after there have been positive abnormal
returns, and insider buying tends to take place after there have been
negative abnormal returns.34 These trading patterns are consistent with
insiders' abstaining on nonpublic information until the information is
released and the price becomes more favorable to them.
Because of this "abstention problem," legal commentators-both those
favoring insider trading regulation and those opposed to it-have argued
that insiders retain an advantage over public shareholders even if the
insiders are prevented from trading on nonpublic information. For example,
Henry Manne, perhaps the most well-known academic critic of insider
trading regulation, has written:
A failure to sell cannot be a violation of the SEC's Rule lOb-5,
because there has been no securities transaction....
The upshot of all this is that people can make abnormal profits
in the stock market simply by knowing when not to buy and when
not to sell.... And this is a form of insider trading that no one can
do anything about.35
Similar views have been expressed by commentators favoring even
stricter regulation of insiders. For example, according to Professor Stephen
Salbu, "'[I]nsider abstention' ... is indistinguishable from [insider trading]
in terms of fairness and equality of market participation....
Unfortunately... it is both legally and logistically difficult to regulate the
use of inside information as a factor in the decision to abstain from
trading., 36 This view is held outside of the United States as well. A number
of German commentators, for example, have argued that insider abstention
should be outlawed because it involves as much exploitation of inside
information as insider trading.37
32. See, e.g., W.V. Harlow & John S. Howe, Leveraged Buyouts and Insider Nontrading,
FIN. MGMT., Spring 1993, at 109, 117-18.
33. See Christopher F. Noe, Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions, 27 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 305, 306 (1999).
34. Ji-Chai Lin & John S. Howe, Insider Trading in the OTC Market, 45 J. FIN. 1273, 1278
(1990); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN.
ECON. 189, 196 (1986).
35. Manne, supra note 8, at 938.
36. Salbu, supra note 9, at 333-34 (footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., Hartmut Krause, The German Securities Trading Act (1994): A Ban on Insider
Trading and an Issuer's Affirmative Duty To Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, 30 INT'L
LAW. 555, 572-73 (1996) (reporting that other commentators have suggested that the German
Securities Trading Act's prohibition against exploitation of inside information "also extends to
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B. Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong: A Numerical Example
This Section uses a numerical example to explain why the conventional
wisdom about insider abstention is wrong. The following Section presents a
simple formal model to illustrate the distributional effects of insiders'
ability to trade or abstain on nonpublic information in a variety of
informational and legal environments.
Consider again the CEO of ABC Corp. and the similarly situated public
shareholder, both of whom intend to sell one million shares Monday
afternoon. In the example above, the CEO learns Monday morning that
earnings are substantially higher than expected and that this good news will
be released Tuesday. The market price on Monday is $10 per share. She
abstains from selling until after the good news is released and the price has
risen to $12 per share. She thus makes $2 million more selling her stock
than the similarly situated public shareholder who, not knowing of the
imminent announcement, sells his one million shares for $10 per share. As
this example illustrates, an insider planning to sell shares can earn higher
returns than the similarly situated public shareholder by abstaining from
selling when she learns that good news will emerge shortly and boost the
stock price.
But suppose the insider intending to sell shares learns that bad news
will emerge shortly and reduce the stock price. If this information is
considered "material," selling those shares while the bad news is not yet
public would violate Rule lOb-5. Thus, the insider is prohibited from
selling her shares until the bad news has been released and become
reflected in the stock price. As a result, the insider must postpone the sale
until the bad news is disclosed and sell her shares at the lower,
postdisclosure price.
38
Suppose, for example, that on Monday morning, the CEO of ABC
Corp. learns that last quarter's earnings were substantially lower than
expected. The earnings announcement, which is to be released Tuesday, is
likely to cause the stock price (currently $10) to drop significantly. The
CEO cannot sell her shares on Monday afternoon while in possession of
insiders who, with full knowledge of the facts, abstain from transactions they would have carried
out had they not possessed inside information," but arguing that "there should be no grounds to
punish loss-avoiding insider abstention"); Peter M. Memminger, The New German Insider Law:
Introduction and Discussion in Relation to United States Securities Law. 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 189,
216 (1996) (asserting that although "it would have been sound from a theoretical point of view to
include a provision covering nonselling or nonpurchasing [on inside information], the [German
Securities Trading] Act's limitation to affirmative acts seems justifiable [because of enforcement
limitations]").
38. Cf Jon A. Garfinkel, New Evidence on the Effects of Federal Regulations on Insider
Trading: The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA), 3 J. CORP. FIN. 89
(1997) (reporting that following the toughening of insider trading sanctions in 1988, corporate
insiders were more likely to postpone liquidity sales until after negative earnings surprises).
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nonpublic information indicating that the stock price will fall. She is forced,
therefore, to abstain from selling until the earnings are released. The
earnings are released on Tuesday, reducing the stock price to $8. The CEO
then sells her one million shares at a price of $8 per share for a total of $8
million.
Compare the CEO to the similarly situated public shareholder who also
intends to sell one million shares for $10 on Monday afternoon but lacks
the same inside information. There is no reason for the public shareholder
to delay his trade. He sells his shares for $10 each on Monday afternoon,
for a total of $10 million. The receipt of inside information therefore costs
the CEO $2 million.
Thus, in the good news scenario, an insider planning to sell shares can
make herself better off than a similarly situated public shareholder by
abstaining from selling until the good news emerges and boosts the stock
price. But in the bad news scenario, the insider is compelled to abstain from
selling and thereby is made worse off than the similarly situated outsider,
who is free to sell his shares before the price has dropped. In short, the
insider's ability to abstain on nonpublic information indicating that a
planned trade would be unfavorable merely compensates the insider for her
inability to proceed with a trade after learning nonpublic information
indicating that the planned trade would be favorable.
Again, I am not claiming that insiders currently are unable to trade
while in possession of inside information. As I explained earlier, Rule
1Ob-5 does not always deter insiders from trading illegally on material
inside information. Moreover, Rule lOb-5 permits trading while in
possession of important but "sub-material" information. Rather, my purpose
is to attack the conventional wisdom about insider abstention-that even
insiders unable to trade while in possession of nonpublic information could
beat the market by using nonpublic information to decide when not to trade.
Debunking the conventional wisdom requires me to show only that insiders
unable to trade while in possession of inside information could not
outperform public shareholders through insider abstention.
C. The Model
I now present a model for analyzing insiders' expected returns under a
variety of assumptions about insiders' access to nonpublic information and
their ability to trade and abstain while aware of inside information. I first
use the model to examine an insider's expected trading returns when she is
unaware of nonpublic information at the time she decides whether or not to
go forward with a previously planned trade. I then assume that the insider
becomes aware of nonpublic information before executing the previously
planned trade, and analyze her expected returns under three trading
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
environments: (1) where the insider is able either to trade or to abstain
while aware of nonpublic information, (2) where the insider is able to
abstain but not to trade while aware of nonpublic information, and
(3) where the insider is able neither to abstain nor to trade while aware of
nonpublic information.
1. Framework ofAnalysis
Consider a corporation, ABC, that has a single insider, CEO. At time
To, CEO decides tentatively to sell (or to buy) ABC shares. The trade would
be effected at time T2. Whether or not at time T2 CEO sells (or buys) ABC
shares depends on two factors: (1) the nonpublic information, if any, CEO
receives beforehand at time T1; and (2) the legal restrictions, if any, on
CEO's ability to trade (or abstain from trading) in ABC shares at time T2.39
If CEO sells ABC shares at time T2, she uses the proceeds to buy shares
of a market-wide index fund. She then holds those fund shares until she
liquidates them at time T3.4 ° If CEO abstains from selling ABC shares at
time T2, she holds those shares until time T3. If CEO buys ABC shares at
time T-z, she sells shares in the market-wide index fund to finance the
purchase and holds ABC shares until she sells them at time T3. If CEO
abstains from buying ABC shares, she holds the market-wide index fund
shares (that she would have sold to purchase ABC shares) until time T3. The
sequence of events is depicted in the following timeline.
FIGURE 1. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
CEO decides Possible receipt CEO trades or CEO
to trade at T2  of inside abstains liquidates
information portfolio
I I I I
T. T T2 T 3
Denote as M the expected return of the market (and of the market-wide
index fund) between times T2 and T3. If CEO becomes aware of nonpublic
information at time T1, that nonpublic information will indicate whether
ABC shares are likely to outperform (or underperform) the market between
39. The results would be the same if times To and T, were reversed (e.g., CEO first learns
inside information and then learns of an investment opportunity that requires her to sell ABC
shares), or if times To, TI, and 712 were all collapsed into a single point in time.
40. 1 assume that CEO's trading is anonymous and does not affect the market price of any
securities.
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times T2 and T 3 .41 For ease of exposition, I assume the information, if any,
indicates with certainty whether ABC shares will outperform or will
underperform the market.42
Denote the ex ante likelihood (as of time TO) that ABC shares will
outperform the market between times T2 and '3 as p, where 0 < p < 1. The
ex ante likelihood that ABC shares will underperform the market between
times T2 and T3 is therefore denoted as I - p. When ABC outperforms the
market, the expected "abnormal" positive return (the degree to which ABC
is expected to beat the market) is denoted as x, where x > 0. When ABC
underperforms the market, the expected abnormal negative return (the
degree to which ABC is expected to underperform the market) is denoted as
y, where y > 0. I assume that at time To, ABC's expected return between
time T2 and time T3 is neither lower nor higher than the market's expected
return during that period. 43 That is, p(M + x) + (1 - p)(M- y) = M or,
equivalently, px = (1 - p)y.
Below, I examine CEO's expected return at time To under varying
assumptions about her information set and her ability to trade and abstain
while aware of inside information.
2. CEO Lacks Inside Information
I begin by considering the scenario in which CEO does not have any
nonpublic information bearing on the value of ABC shares when deciding
at time T2 whether to go forward with her trade. In other words, CEO is in
the same position as the typical public shareholder trading in ABC shares.
Under these conditions, CEO should not be able to beat the market.
We first examine the case in which CEO intends to sell, and then the
scenario in which she intends to buy.
41. There could be a third possibility: The nonpublic information indicates that ABC shares
are likely to generate the market return. Omitting this possibility does not affect any of the
analysis.
42. The assumption of certainty is made only for simplicity and is not necessary for the
results generated by the model. The results would be the same if the information were merely
probabilistic. For example, the results would be the same if the "good news" information
indicated that there was a 70% chance that ABC would outperform the market and a 30% chance
that ABC would underperform the market, and the "bad news" information indicated that there
was a 70% likelihood that ABC would underperform the market and a 30% likelihood that ABC
would outperform the market. The results also would be the same if an insider's ability to process
the inside information were limited and, as a result, the insider were not always correct in her
assessment as to whether or not ABC would outperform the market.
43. If ABC's expected return, based on public information, were either higher or lower than
the market return, investors would either bid up or bid down the stock price until the price was
such that ABC's expected return equaled that of the market. For convenience, I assume that
investors are risk-neutral, and therefore are interested only in the expected returns of investments.
Adjusting the expected return of ABC shares for risk would not change the overall result.
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Selling. Suppose at time To CEO decides to sell ABC shares at time 72.
Lacking any inside information at time T, indicating that she should not sell
ABC shares, CEO goes forward with the sale at time T2 and invests the sale
proceeds in the market-wide index fund. Accordingly, CEO expects to earn
M, the market return, between times T2 and 73.
TABLE 1. CEO SELLS WITHOUT INSIDE INFORMATION
Buying. Next consider the case in which, at time To, CEO becomes
inclined to buy ABC shares at time T2. In the absence of any inside
information at time T1 indicating that she should abstain from the purchase,
CEO sells index fund shares and buys ABC shares. If ABC outperforms the
market, CEO will expect to earn a return of M + x. If ABC underperforms
the market, CEO will expect to earn a return of M - y. By assumption, at
time To ABC's expected return between times I' and T3 is that of the
market. CEO therefore expects to earn the market return between times T2
and T3 on the ABC shares she purchases.
TABLE 2. CEO BUYS WITHOUT INSIDE INFORMATION
Sells market index
Buys ABC
Thus, when CEO is unaware of any inside information, her expected
return from either buying or selling ABC shares at time 12 equals M, the
expected market return. This result is not surprising. Insiders trading
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without the benefit of nonpublic information should not expect to beat the
market.
3. CEO Abstains and Trades While Aware of Inside Information
Now suppose CEO receives nonpublic information at time T, bearing
on the expected performance of ABC shares between times T2 and T3.
Under the assumption that CEO receives nonpublic information, I will
examine CEO's expected return under three trading environments:
(1) where CEO is able either to trade or to abstain while aware of nonpublic
information, (2) where CEO is able to abstain but not to trade while aware
of nonpublic information, and (3) where CEO can neither abstain nor trade
while aware of such information. In each scenario, I assume that at time T,
CEO always receives nonpublic information indicating either that ABC
shares will outperform the market between times T2 and T3 or that ABC
shares will underperform the market during that period. (The results of the
analysis would not change if in each of these scenarios CEO sometimes
received no inside information at time T, bearing on the expected return of
ABC shares. For ease of exposition, 1 therefore omit this possibility.)
This Subsection examines CEO's expected returns from trading in a
world where CEO can either trade or abstain from trading ABC shares at
time T2 while aware of nonpublic information bearing on ABC's expected
return between times T2 and T3. Currently, there are likely to be many
circumstances where insiders trade while in possession of nonpublic
information. As noted in Section II.B, Rule lOb-5 permits an insider to
trade while in possession of valuable nonpublic information as long as that
information is not considered "material." In addition, Rule lOb-5 may fail
to deter an insider from trading while in possession of "material" nonpublic
information when the likelihood of apprehension is very low. For purposes
of this analysis, however, it does not matter why CEO is able to trade while
aware of inside information. I simply assume that CEO is able both to trade
and to abstain while aware of nonpublic information, and examine her
expected returns under such a scenario.
Selling. Consider first the case in which CEO intends to sell ABC
shares. If CEO learns at time T, that ABC will outperform the market
between times T2 and T3, she will not effect her planned sale of ABC shares
at time T2. Instead, she will retain those shares and sell them at time '3,
after ABC has outperformed the market. Her expected return between times
T2 and T3 is therefore M+ x.
If, on the other hand, CEO learns at time T, that ABC will
underperform the market, at time T2 she will sell her ABC shares as she had
intended at time To and buy shares in the market-wide index fund.
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Consequently, her expected return between times T2 and 7, is M, the
expected market return.
TABLE 3. CEO CAN ABSTAIN OR SELL ON INSIDE INFORMATION




Recall that the probability that ABC will outperform the market is p.
Thus, in a scenario where CEO learns inside information about ABC before
carrying out an intended sale of ABC shares, and is able to abstain or trade
while aware of that inside information, her expected return as of time To is
M+ px, 44 which is higher than the expected market return.
Note that if CEO learns that ABC will outperform the market, she
might not only cancel her sale of ABC shares but also buy additional shares
(or call options on ABC stock). These purchases would further boost her
trading profits. Similarly, if CEO learns that ABC will underperform the
market, she might not only go through with her planned sale of ABC shares
but also sell additional shares.4 ' The important point, however, is that if
CEO merely abstains from selling when she learns good news and effects
her previously planned sale when she learns bad news, she will expect, on
average, to beat the market.
Buying. Next consider the case in which at time T0 CEO intends to buy
ABC shares at time T2. If, at time i, CEO learns ABC will outperform the
market, she proceeds to buy the stock and expects a return of M + x. If, on
the other hand, CEO learns that ABC will underperform the market, she
abstains from purchasing the stock and remains invested in the market-wide
index fund. In this case, her expected return between times T2 and T3 is M.
44. CEO's expected return before knowing whether the news is good or bad is
p(M+ x) + (1 -p)M, which simplifies to M+px.
45. In the United States, a CEO or any other high-ranking officer or director is not permitted
to sell short shares of her firm or to buy put options on its stock. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2000). But other types of insiders (such as lower-level
employees) do not face this per se prohibition.
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TABLE 4. CEO CAN ABSTAIN OR BUy ON INSIDE INFORMIATION
Sells market index M+
Buys ABC
Cancels purchase of ABC M
Holds market index
Thus, after tentatively deciding to buy but before learning whether
ABC will outperform or underperform the market, CEO expects a return of
M + px between times T2 and T3, which is higher than the expected market
return (and, incidentally, equal to her expected return when she intends to
sell rather than buy ABC stock).
Of course, if CEO plans to buy stock and then learns good news, she
might consider buying even more stock or call options. Similarly, if she
learns bad news, she might not only abandon her plan to buy shares, but
might also sell other shares. The critical point here is that if an insider who
had planned to buy stock simply abstains from or proceeds with the
purchase based on subsequently acquired nonpublic information she will
expect to beat the market.
4. CEO Abstains but Cannot Trade While Aware of Inside
Information
I now consider CEO's trading performance under a regime in which she
is able to abstain but not trade while aware of inside information.
According to the conventional wisdom, insiders could still outperform
public shareholders under such a regime because of their ability to abstain
on nonpublic information. As the model now demonstrates, the
coavenional wisdom is wrong: Insiders who can abstain but not trade while
in possession of nonpublic information cannot systematically beat the
market.
Selling. Begin with the situation in which CEO plans, at time TO., to sell
ABC shares at time T1. At time T1, she receives inside infoirnation
indicating either that ABC will outperform the market or that it will
underperform the market. If she receives information indicating ABC will
outperform the market, CEO abstains from selling ABC shares and expects
to earn a return of A + x on those shares between times 71) and T3.
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If she instead learns bad news, CEO will wish to proceed with her
planned sale but cannot because she is aware of inside information
indicating the stock price will soon fall. Forced to retain her ABC shares,
CEO will expect to earn a return of M- y.
TABLE 5. CEO CAN ABSTAIN BUT NOT SEL ON INSIDE INFORMATION
Cancels sale of ABC M 4 X
Holds ABC
Mutst cancel sale of ABC M
Holds ABC
Under this abstain/no-trade regime, when CEO learns inside
information after deciding to sell ABC shares, she will either choose or be
forced to retain those shares. Because by assumption the expected return on
ABC shares at time 7() equals the expected market return, CEO expects, as
of time T0, to earn the market return, 6
Buiaing. Next consider the case in which CEO plans, at time To, to buy
ABC shares. If she learns good news--that ABC will outperform the
market--she cannot effect her planned purchase under a regime prohibiting
trading while aware of inside information. As a result, CEO must hold on to
the shares in the market-wide index fuind that she would have sold to
46. One might ask why CEO would ever plan to sell ABC shares under a regime that
prohibits trading while aware of inside information. If CEO learns good news before selling, she
will choose to hold her shares. If she learns bad news, she will be prohibited from selling her
shares. In either scenario, CEO will abandon the intended sale. It thus does not seem rational for
CEO to plan to sell ABC shares in the first instance.
This inconsistency arises from the simplifying assumption that CEO either (1) learns good
news or (2) learns bad news. One could eliminate this inconsistency, and make the model more
realistic, by incorporating a third possibility- that CEO receives no nonpublic information
bearing on the value of ABC shares. That is, CEO receives (1) good news, (2) bad news, or (3) no
news. Under a regime prohibiting trading while aware of inside information, CEO would neither
choose nor be ftrccd to abandon her planned sale of ABC shares in the scenario where she
receives no news. Thus, as long as there is a possibility that CEO receives no news, it will be
rational for her to forn a plan to sell shares under such a regime.
As I noted earlier, incorporating this third possibility- -that the insider receives no nonpublic
information bearing on the value of her firm's shares--would not change the results under any of
the trading environments being studied. Thus, under a regime where an insider can abstain but not
trade while aware of nonpublic infornition, the insider still would expect to earn the market
return in selling her sbares. Incorporating this third possibility into the buying scenario, which I
discuss shortly, also would have no effect on the result.
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finance the purchase of ABC shares. She therefore anticipates earning the
expected market return, A.
If CEO learns bad news about ABC, she will choose to abstain from
purchasing ABC shares. She will hold her index fund shares and expect to
earn M. Thus, under a regime that prevents trading while in possession of
inside information but permits insider abstention, when CEO is inclined to
buy shares she will expect to earn M, both when she learns good news and
when she learns bad news.




Cacels purchase of ABC M
Holds market index
Consequently, an insider who can abstain but not trade while in
possession of nonpublic information cannot expect to beat the market,
whether the insider is inclined to sell shares or to buy them. The widely
held belief that insiders can earn higher trading returns than public
shareholders merely by abstaining on nonpublic information is incorrect. To
outperform public shareholders, insiders must be able to trade while in
possession of nonpublic information.
It is worth noting the difference between the trading environment
studied here---one in which insiders can abstain but not trade while aware
of nonpublic information-and Rule 1Ob-5, the regime that currently
governs insider trading. Although insiders in this trading environment can
abstain but not trade while aware of any nonpublic information, Rule 1 Ob-5
prohibits trading only if the person is aware of "material" inside
information. Consequently, Rule 1Ob-5 permits an insider to abstain but not
to trade while aware of "material" nonpublic information, and thus prevents
insiders from beating the market by using such infortnation. If the
materiality standard were low enough to cover all nonpublic information
indicating that the stock would beat or underperform the market, and if
Rule 1Ob-5 could be fully enforced, it would have the same effect as the
trading environment studied here: Insiders prevented from trading on
material nonpublic information could not beat the market.
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5. CEO Can Neither Abstain nor Trade While Aware of Inside
lnjbrmnation
As we saw in Section A, commentators on both sides of the insider
trading debate have concluded that even if insiders were unable to trade
while in possession of nonpublic information, their ability to engage in
insider abstention would enable them to outperform public shareholders.
Indeed, commentators critical of insider trading have argued that it would
be desirable, at least in principle, to prevent insiders from engaging both in
insider trading and in insider abstention.47 I have just shown that if insiders
cannot trade while aware of nonpublic information, insider abstention does
not enable them to beat the market over time. I now use the model to show
that if insiders can neither trade nor abstain while aware of nonpublic
information, they will systematically earn below-market returns.
Selling. Suppose at time T CEO plans to sell ABC shares at time 7T2. If
she learns good news about ABC at time T1, she will wish to abstain from
selling her ABC shares at time 71. But under a no-abstain/no-trade regime,
she is not permitted to abstain on such infornation. As a result, she is
forced to sell her shares. She invests the proceeds in the market-wide index
fund and expects to earn a return of M, the expected market return. If at
time T, she learns bad news about ABC, she cannot sell the shares because
she is aware of inside information indicating the trade would be favorable.
Forced to hold the shares, she expects a return of only M-y.




Must cancel sale of ABC M VHolds ABCM-
Before knowing whether there is good or bad news, CEO thus expects
to earn a return of M (1 - p), 48 which is less than the expected market
return. The reason CEO expects to earn a below-inarket return is that the
47. See, e.g., Memminger, supra note 37, at 215-16; Salbu, supra note 9, at 333-34.
48. Because the probability that ABC will outperfonn the market is p, CEO expects a return
ofpA-+ (1 -p)(M1- y), which simplifies to M- (I -p)y.
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no-abstainno--trade regime prevents her from going forward with a sale of
ABC shares when she learns bad news, and fails to compensate by allowing
her to abstain from the sale when she learns good news.
Bzring. Now suppose that at time To CEO plans to buy ABC shares at
time T2. If CEO learns good news about ABC at time T1, she will want to
proceed with the purchase. Under the no-abstain/no-trade regime, however,
she will not be permitted to buy ABC shares while aware of good news. As
a result, CEO will hold her shares in the market-wide index fund and expect
to earn a return of M.
If she learns bad news about ABC at time T1, she will wish to abstain
from the purchase. But under the no-abstain component of the
no-abstain/no-trade regime, she will be forced to purchase the stock. She
will thus expect to earn a return of M-y.
T&ABLE 8. CEO CANNOT ABSTAIN OR BUY WHILE AWARE
OF INSIDE INFORMATION
Cancels purchase of ABC A
Holds market index
Must purchase
Sells market index Al-
Before knowing whether there is good news or bad news, CEO expects
to earn a return, of M- (1 --p)y, the same expected return as in the selling
scenario. Thus, as is the case of an insider intending to sell shares. an
insider intending to buy shares in the no-abstainno-trade regime expects to
underperron the market.
D. Possible As ,mmeto in Receipt of Inside Information
The analysis presented in Sections B and C rnade certain assumptions
about the flow of nonpublic inforniation to an insider. In particular, it
assumed that when the insider has access to nonpublic information, she
learns either good news (that her firm's stock will outperform the market)
or bad news (that the stock will underperform the market). This Section
responds to a possible objection to this informational assumption--that
corporate insiders might be more likely to learn of good news (when such
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news exists) than to learn of bad news (when such news exists), or
vice versa.
The numerical example in Section B and the model presented in
Section C both assumed that ABC's CEO receives inside information
before effecting an intended purchase or sale of ABC shares. That
information indicates either that (1) ABC is likely to outperform the market,
or (2) ABC is likely to underperform the market. CEO then acts on this
information (subject to any restrictions on trading or abstaining while aware
of inside information). Under this informational assumption, we have seen
that when CEO is unable to trade while in possession of inside information,
she cannot expect to beat the market by using inside information to abstain
from trading. One might argue, however, that insiders are more likely to
receive one type of news than the other. For example, insiders might be
more likely to learn of good news (when such news exists) than to learn of
bad news (when such news exists). As I explain below, such an asymmetry
in nonpublic information, combined with an asymmetry in trading (an
insider sells more than he buys, or vice versa), would appear to enable the
insider to beat the market merely by abstaining on nonpublic information.
Suppose, for example, that CEO sells shares but never buys them.
Assume also, for simplicity, that there is always nonpublic information
bearing on the value of ABC shares. That information indicates either that
ABC will beat the market (good news) or that ABC will underperform the
market (bad news). Finally, assume that CEO learns all undisclosed good
news but never learns bad news before it is disclosed. For example, imagine
CEO receives all of her information through a loyal assistant. Before selling
any shares, CEO instructs the assistant to gather from high-level managers
any nonpublic information bearing on the value of the firm's stock. CEO
tells the assistant to reveal the information to CEO if, and only if, it
indicates ABC will outperform the market. Otherwise, the assistant should
remain silent. If the assistant reports that ABC will outperform the market,
CEO abstains from selling the ABC shares and expects to earn an abnormal
positive return holding those shares. If the assistant is silent, CEO sells the
stock, buys shares in a market-wide index fund, and expects to earn the
market return.
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TABLE 9. CEO CAN ABSTAIN BUT NOT SELL ON INSIDE INFORMATION
(AND HER ASSISTANT DISCLOSES ONLY GOOD NEWS)
Cancels sale of ABC +
T -If IHolds ABC
Sells ABC M
Buys market index
It would appear in this case that CEO could expect to beat the market
simply by insider abstention. If CEO plans to sell her ABC shares and then
learns good news, she abstains until the good news is announced and sells
for a higher price. If CEO intends to sell and the assistant reveals no good
news, she can, it would seem, proceed with her sale, even though there may
be undisclosed bad news. If so, CEO would benefit by abstaining on good
news, and would not be burdened by the inability to sell when there is bad
news. Under these circumstances, she would beat the market on average.
Under an abstain/no-trade regime, however, CEO would not be
permitted to sell ABC shares when the assistant is silent. If CEO's assistant
provides CEO with nonpublic information whenever that information
indicates ABC will outperform the market, the assistant's silence implies
that there is no undisclosed information that ABC will outperform the
market. This leaves only one possibility: that there is nonpublic information
indicating that ABC will underperform the market. CEO can thus infer from
the assistant's silence that there is bad news. In other words, the assistant's
silence itself is nonpublic information bearing on the expected return of
ABC's shares. Under a regime where CEO is unable to trade while aware of
nonpublic information indicating that the trade will be favorable, CEO must
therefore abstain from selling ABC shares when her assistant does not
disclose any good news. Accordingly, when the assistant is silent, CEO
must hold the ABC shares and will expect to earn a below-market return.
The example assumed that CEO always learns of undisclosed good
news. But the result is the same if CEO learns good news at some times but
not at other times. Suppose, for example, that (1) when there is good news
(that ABC will outperform the market), there is only a probability g (where
0 < g < 1) that CEO will learn of that good news from the assistant; and (2)
when there is bad news (that ABC will underperform the market), CEO
never learns the underlying information until it is made public. And
suppose, as in the model, that the likelihood there is good news is p; the
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likelihood there is bad news is 1 -p; the good news causes ABC to beat the
market by x; and the bad news causes ABC to underperform the market by
y (where px = (1 -p)y). Now, CEO cannot infer from the assistant's silence
that ABC will underperform the market, because there is some likelihood
that there is good news of which CEO is not aware.
But the absence of good news from the assistant still provides
nonpublic information about the expected return of ABC: that, on an
expectation basis, ABC will underperform the market. In particular, the
expected return of ABC relative to the market, conditional on the assistant
not revealing good news, is -pgx/(1 _ pg).49 As a result, CEO still has inside
information indicating that, on an expectation basis, she will earn a higher
return by selling her shares than by keeping them. And in a regime where
insiders cannot sell shares while aware of any nonpublic information
indicating that the stock is likely to underperform the market, CEO could
not go forward with her sale. Rather, she would have to hold on to her
shares until she no longer had inside information indicating the sale would
be favorable. One could make the example more complex by assuming that
CEO sometimes learns of bad news and that sometimes there is no inside
information bearing on the value of ABC's shares. But the result would be
the same: CEO could not expect to beat the market simply by abstaining on
nonpublic information.
To be clear, I am not claiming that the assistant's silence in this
example would be considered "material" nonpublic information under Rule
lOb-5. Nor am I advocating that such information should be considered
"material" under Rule 1Ob-5. My claim is only that if insiders cannot sell
(or buy) while in possession of any nonpublic information indicating that
the stock is likely to underperform (or outperform) the market, they cannot
beat the market even if they can abstain on nonpublic information. Put
differently, insiders who abstain on nonpublic information can beat the
market only if they also are able to trade while aware of nonpublic
information indicating that the trade is favorable to them.
49. ABC's expected return, conditional on the assistant's silence, is calculated as follows.
The probability that the assistant is silent is p(l - g) + (1 - p), which equals I - pg. Call this
probability P,. The probability that there is good news even though the assistant is silent is
p(I - g)P. The probability that there is bad news when the assistant is silent is (I -p)IPn. The
expected abnormal return of ABC shares, given the assistant's silence, is therefore
A( - g) (I - P) y.
P. P
Call this expected abnormal return E.. Because by assumption the expected return of ABC is that
of the market, and thus px = (I -p)y, the second term of E, is equivalent to pxlP,. E, can then be
simplified to
p(l - g) X P x,
Po Pg
which in turn can be reduced to -pgx/P. or -pgx/(1 -pg).
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E. The Effects of Insider Abstention on Managers 'Incentives
Although a complete study of the effects of insider abstention on
managers' incentives is beyond the scope of this Essay, a preliminary
analysis suggests that managerial incentives are unlikely to be distorted if
managers are able to abstain (but not trade) while aware of inside
information. Indeed, as I explain below, managers' ability to abstain on
inside information is likely to improve their incentives. Thus, reducing
managers' ability to abstain on inside information is unlikely to generate
efficiency benefits and may well impose efficiency costs.
Supporters of insider trading regulation have argued that insider trading
can distort managerial incentives in at least four different ways: (1) by
inducing managers to engage in overly risky projects designed to generate
large price swings,50 (2) by giving managers an incentive not to share
information internally within the firm,5 1 (3) by giving managers an
incentive to delay disclosure of news to the market and to generate
rumors,52 and (4) by reducing managers' incentives to exert effort.1
3
As I explain below, each of these four distortions is likely to arise only
if managers are able to buy or sell shares at a price that does not reflect their
nonpublic information. Insider abstention does not give managers this
opportunity. If a manager abstains from trading until nonpublic information
50. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332; see also Mark Bagnoli &
Naveen Khanna, Insider Trading in Financial Signaling Models, 47 J. FIN. 1905, 1909 (1992)
(explaining that management may have an incentive to act inefficiently to make insider trading
profits); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock
Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448-57 (1967) (arguing that managers permitted to trade on inside
information will run the company to maximize insider trading opportunities rather than to
maximize shareholder value). Other commentators, however, have argued that the prospect of
insider trading profits could improve risk-averse managers' project choices by rewarding them for
choosing higher-risk, higher-value projects. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman,
Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice Among Risky Projects, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1 (1994) (presenting a model in which insider trading can either worsen or improve
risk-averse managers' project choices).
51. See, e.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 15, § 2.3.2, at 34; Robert J. Haft, The Effect of
Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1051, 1064 (1982) (arguing that the ability to trade on inside information could interfere with
internal firm decisionmaking processes).
52. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 15, § 2.3.1, at 32 n.8; Stephen Bainbridge, The
Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 53-54
(1986); Dyer, supra note 29, at 21.
53. See. e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
"Chicago School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628 (observing that the ability to trade on inside information
might discourage managerial effort by permitting managers to profit even when news is bad);
Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470,
489-90 (1969) (reviewing HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966)) (same). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, The Effects of Insider Trading
on Insiders' Effort in Good and Bad Times, 9 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 469 (1993) (finding that
managerial effort will increase when managers get good news because they will buy more stock
and will decrease when managers get bad news because they will sell stock).
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emerges, the postponed purchase or sale will take place at a price that
reflects that information. As a result, insider abstention is less likely than
insider trading to generate these distortions.
Consider first managers' incentives to engage in excessively risky
projects. Under a regime that enables managers to trade on inside
information, the prospect of insider trading profits might induce managers
to engage in low present value projects that have large upside potential. If
managers have nonpublic information indicating that such a project will
succeed, they can buy shares before the information is disclosed and sell
those shares for a large profit after the news is released. If the managers
have nonpublic information indicating that the project will fail, the
managers can sell their shares before the information about the failure is
made public. Such sales reduce the cost to managers of the project's failure.
By increasing managers' payoffs from large stock price increases and
protecting managers from large share price declines, insider trading might
induce managers to forego good projects in favor of less desirable projects
with greater variance in outcomes. In essence, insider trading might distort
managers' choices of projects because it enables them to decouple their
financial fate from that of the firm's shareholders.
A regime in which managers can abstain but not trade while aware of
inside information is unlikely to have such effects. If managers know that a
project will succeed, they can abstain from selling their shares until after
the good news is released, and thus receive a price for their shares that
reflects the value created by the project. But insider abstention, unlike
insider trading, does not enable managers to boost their profits by buying
shares shortly before the good news is released. Thus, the payoff to
equity-owning managers from a good outcome is no more and no less than
their pro rata share of the increase in the equity value of the firm.
Moreover, insider abstention, unlike insider trading, fails to offer
managers protection on the downside. If the managers know that the project
will fail, they cannot sell their shares before the bad news emerges and the
stock price falls. As a result, managers bear their pro rata share of the
decrease in the firm's equity value resulting from the project's failure.
When the managers know the project will fail, their ability to abstain on
that information enables them only to avoid the additional losses they
would incur from buying more shares at a price that exceeds their actual
value. Because insider abstention neither increases the payoff to managers
from good outcomes nor reduces the cost to managers of bad outcomes, it is
much less likely than insider trading to induce managers to choose low-
value projects with large upsides.
Next consider the second and third potential distortions associated with
insider trading-that insider trading might interfere with internal firm
communications and delay disclosure to the market. The prospect of insider
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trading profits might give managers an incentive to hoard and trade on
inside information before revealing it to others in and outside the firm.
Insider abstention does not have these adverse effects. A manager who
abstains from trading until certain nonpublic information is released has no
interest in delaying the release of that information to others within the firm
or to the market. On the contrary, because the manager prefers to trade as
soon as possible at the better price, she has an incentive to hasten the
information's incorporation into the stock price by immediately
transmitting the information to others.
The fourth possible distortion is that managers' ability to engage in
insider trading might cause them to inefficiently reduce their level of effort.
Managers learning bad news can sell their shares before that information is
released and the stock price falls. The ability to sell on bad news thus
reduces the cost to managers of poor performance. Consequently, managers
might have less incentive to exert effort to avoid such an outcome.
Under a regime that prevents managers from trading while in
possession of nonpublic information, managers' ability to abstain on such
information is unlikely to reduce their incentives to exert effort. If managers
exert too little effort, thereby generating bad news, they cannot sell their
shares until the bad news is released. As a result, managers must bear their
pro rata share of the reduction in equity value caused by their reduced
effort. The cost to managers of reducing effort is thus much greater than
when they are free to sell on bad news.
Indeed, insider abstention may well improve managers' incentives to
exert effort by enabling managers to trade at prices that better reflect the
actual value of their firms' shares. For example, suppose a CEO generates
value for shareholders by increasing the firm's earnings. The earnings
information has not yet been disclosed to the market. Suppose further that
the CEO is planning to sell shares and wishes to sell at a price that reflects
the higher earnings. The announcement of the good news, however, must be
delayed. If the CEO cannot abstain on inside information, she must sell her
shares at a price below their actual value. Anticipating this possibility, she
has less incentive to create that value in the first instance. If the CEO can
abstain until the information about the earnings is made public, she can
derive greater benefit from the value she created, and thus has more
incentive to create that value ex ante.
A complete study of the effects of insider abstention on managerial
behavior would require a systematic comparison between the incentives
created when managers can abstain but not trade while in possession of
inside information and the incentives created when managers can neither
abstain nor trade while aware of inside information. But the preliminary
analysis offered here suggests that insider abstention is much less likely to
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distort managers' incentives than insider trading, and might even improve
them.
F. Summary
This Part has systematically considered the distributional consequences
of insider abstention and offered a preliminary examination of the effects of
insider abstention on managers' incentives. As is well understood, insiders
who can both abstain and trade while aware of nonpublic information are
able to outperform the market. But contrary to the conventional wisdom,
insiders who can abstain but not trade while in possession of nonpublic
information cannot systematically outperform public shareholders. Indeed,
insiders who could neither abstain nor trade while aware of nonpublic
information would underperform the market. Accordingly, leveling the
playing field between insiders and public shareholders does not require
eliminating insider abstention. Rather, it requires only eliminating insiders'
ability to trade while in possession of nonpublic information. Turning to the
efficiency effects of insider abstention, Section E's preliminary
examination of insider abstention's effects on managers' incentives
suggests that the potential distortions caused by insider trading are unlikely
to arise as a result of insider abstention. Thus, there appears to be no
efficiency benefit to reducing insider abstention by managers. We are now
ready to consider the policy implications of this Part's analysis.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. The "Possession Versus Use" Debate Under Rule JOb-5
The analysis offered above can shed useful light on the "possession
versus use" debate surrounding Rule 1Ob-5, a debate involving the SEC, the
courts, and various commentators. 54 The "possession versus use" debate
concerns the mental state needed to trigger a violation of Rule lOb-5. To
establish liability, is it sufficient that, at the time of the trade, the insider
knowingly possess material nonpublic information indicating the trade
would be favorable? Or must the insider use that information in deciding
to trade?
54. E.g., Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a Causation Element in the
Prohibition on Insider Trading?, 52 BUS. LAW. 1235 (1997); Karen Schoen, Insider Trading: The
"'Possession Versus Use" Debate, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1999); Stuart Sinai, Rumors,
Possession v. Use, Fiduciary Duty and Other Current Insider Trading Considerations, 55 BUS.
LAW. 743 (2000); Lacey S. Calhoun, Note, Moving Toward a Clearer Definition of Insider
Trading: Why Adoption of the Possession Standard Protects Investors, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1119 (1999); David W. Jolly, Casenote, Knowing Possession vs. Actual Use: Due Process and
Social Costs in Civil Insider Trading Actions, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 233 (1999).
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Suppose, for example, that the CEO of ABC Corp. decides on Monday
morning, when the stock is trading at $10, to sell one million ABC shares
that afternoon. Shortly before selling the shares on Monday afternoon, the
CEO learns that earnings will be much lower than expected and that once
this information emerges on Tuesday the stock price is likely to fall. The
CEO goes ahead with her plan to sell one million shares of her stock at $10
each. On Tuesday, the bad news emerges, and the stock price plunges to $8.
Has the CEO violated Rule 1Ob-5?
According to the SEC 55 and the Second Circuit,5 6 trading while in
knowing possession of material inside information is sufficient to give rise
to a violation of Rule lOb-5.57 But according to the Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, mere knowing possession is not sufficient for Rule
10b-5 liability.58 Instead, the government must demonstrate that the insider
used the information in making the decision to trade. Proof of knowing
possession can, however, create a strong inference of use.59
Participants in the "possession versus use" debate have advanced a
number of policy rationales in favor of each approach.6 ° In defense of the
possession standard, the SEC and others have offered two main arguments
against the use standard. First, the term "use" is ambiguous. To what extent
must material inside information, as opposed to other factors, motivate the
decision to trade for there to be "use"'?61 Second, however "use" is defined,
proving that an insider used a particular item of information in making a
decision to trade is extremely difficult.62 Proponents of the "use" standard,
on the other hand, argue that the "possession" standard is unfair because it
penalizes traders who lack intent to defraud.63
I do not intend here to establish which is the better standard overall.
Rather, the purpose of this Section is to use Part III's analysis to describe
the distributional effects of each standard, given that Rule 1Ob-5 permits
insiders to abstain on material nonpublic information.
As Subsection III.C.4 demonstrated, a regime in which insiders are able
to abstain on nonpublic information, but unable to trade while in possession
of such information, levels the playing field between insiders and public
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob5-1 (2003).
56. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
57. An example of an insider trading statute that specifically adopts the "possession" standard
is California's, which defines insider trading as buying or selling a security at a time when the
insider knows material nonpublic information. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,402 (West 1977).
58. See SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d
1051, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
59. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1340.
60. Participants in the debate have also advanced doctrinal arguments in favor of each
approach, which I will not repeat here.
61. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120; Schoen, supra note 54, at 281-82.
62. See Schoen, supra note 54, at 279-80.
63. See Jolly, supra note 54, at 249-50.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 485
The Yale Law Journal
shareholders. Under such a regime, insiders could not exploit nonpublic
information to beat the market. If a "use" standard were in effect, insiders
would be permitted to trade while in possession of material nonpublic
information indicating that the trade would be favorable-at least in those
cases where the insiders were not considered to be "using" the information
to trade. A regime that prohibits insiders from "using" material nonpublic
information to trade but otherwise permits them both to abstain and trade
while aware of material nonpublic information would enable insiders to
profit from their access to material nonpublic information. Under such a
regime, insiders could use material nonpublic information to beat the
market and earn higher trading returns than public shareholders.
Of course, Rule lOb-5 prohibits trading on inside information only if
the information is "material." Even under a "possession" standard, insiders
are permitted to abstain and to trade while in possession of valuable but
"sub-material" nonpublic information, and to "use" such information in
deciding to trade. As a result, the possession standard still provides insiders
a substantial advantage over public shareholders. But the "use" standard
tilts the playing field even more sharply in favor of insiders by permitting
them also to abstain and to trade while aware of material nonpublic
information (as long as that information is not "used" in the decision to
trade). To the extent greater parity between insiders and public shareholders
is desirable, the "possession" standard is thus superior to the "use"
standard.
B. The SEC's Rule l0b-5 Safe Harbor
Most managers of publicly traded firms receive stock options as part of
their compensation. These options give managers the right to purchase their
corporations' shares at a particular price. After exercising the options and
purchasing shares, managers may decide to hold the stock in their
portfolios. For liquidity and diversification reasons, however, they
frequently sell the shares acquired upon exercising their options.
As Section A explained, the SEC takes the position that Rule 1Ob-5
does not require proof that insiders-including managers-actually "use"
material nonpublic information in their trading decisions. Instead, proof that
the insider has "knowing possession" (or "awareness") is sufficient to
establish liability.
64
Because managers are often aware of material inside information,
however, the SEC's interpretation of Rule lOb-5 would drastically reduce
managers' ability to sell shares, including shares received as part of their
64. The SEC has formally codified this position in Rule 1Ob5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1
(2003).
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compensation, for liquidity or diversification reasons. As a result, the SEC
created a "safe harbor" from Rule 1Ob-5 liability for insiders trading
(buying or selling) pursuant to a prearranged plan, irrevocable instructions
to a third party, or a binding contract.65 Under this safe harbor, insiders are
allowed to trade while in possession of material nonpublic information as
long as the trade is made according to a plan, irrevocable instructions, or a
binding contract created at a time when the insider was not in possession of
material nonpublic information. The SEC has ruled that terminating a
trading plan while in possession of material inside information does not
result in a loss of the safe harbor for past transactions, unless the plan
termination indicates the person was not acting in good faith when he
created the plan.66
The analytical framework presented in Part III can be used to study the
distributional consequences of the SEC's safe harbor. I first examine the
case in which an insider enters the safe harbor through the use of either
irrevocable instructions to a third party or a binding contract. I then
examine the case in which the safe harbor protects the insider because the
trade is made pursuant to a prearranged plan. As we will see, when an
insider qualifies for the safe harbor by employing irrevocable instructions
or a binding contract, she cannot outperform public shareholders through
the use of material inside information. On the other hand, when an insider
enters the SEC's safe harbor by employing a prearranged plan, the ability to
terminate the plan while aware of material nonpublic information permits
her to use material nonpublic information to increase her trading profits.
This Section concludes by explaining how the SEC's safe harbor could
easily be modified to prevent insiders with prearranged trading plans from
using material inside information to increase their trading profits.
1. Trades Pursuant to Irrevocable Instructions or a Binding Contract
Let us consider the distributional effects of the SEC's safe harbor when
an insider gives irrevocable instructions to a third party to effect a particular
trade or enters into a binding contract to effect such a trade. Returning to
the analytical framework introduced in Section III.C, suppose that CEO,
lacking material inside information bearing on the value of ABC's shares,
either gives irrevocable trading instructions to a third party or enters into a
binding contract to sell ABC shares. The proceeds of the sale are to be
invested in a market-wide index fund. Suppose further that after CEO gives
these instructions or enters into the contract, but before any trade occurs,
65. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c).
66. See Div. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TELEPHONE
INTERPRETATIONS ex. 15(b) (Supp. IV 2001) (May 2001 interpretations), http://www.sec.gov/
interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm.
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CEO learns material nonpublic information bearing on the value of ABC
shares.
If CEO learns material nonpublic information indicating that ABC will
outperform the market, CEO would prefer to cancel the sale and retain the
shares until the good news emerges. But if CEO has given truly irrevocable
trading instrnctions to a third party, the third party will sell the shares.
Similarly, if CEO has entered into a binding contract to sell the shares, she
will be required to sell the shares. 7 The proceeds of the sale are invested in
the market-wide index fund. CEO subsequently expects to earn the market
return, M, on those funds.
If, on the other hand, CEO learns material nonpublic information
indicating that ABC will underperform the market, the safe harbor protects
CEO: The subsequent sale of ABC stock (by CEO or by a third party) does
not create Rule 1Ob-5 liability for CEO, even though CEO trades while in
possession of material nonpublic infornation bearing on the value of her
shares. Thus, the safe harbor benefits CEO by enabling her to go forward
with a trade that the SEC would otherwise consider to be in violation of
Rule 1Ob-5. CEO then invests the proceeds of the sale in the market-wide
index fund and expects to earn the market return, M, during the subsequent
period,




Buys market index [M
Thus, whether CEO receives material inside information indicating that
ABC will outperform the market or material inside information indicating
that ABC will underperform the market, CEO's shares are sold pursuant to
the irrevocable instructions or binding contract. In either case, CEO expects
to earn the market return, M, on her postsale portfolio. Thus, if CEO enters
the safe harbor through the use of irrevocable instructions or a binding
67. If CEO were to breach the contract by not selling the shares to her counterparty, the
counterparty could sue for damages and recover whatever gains CEO would reap from breach.
Accordingly, CEO has no incentive to breach the contract.
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contract, she cannot expect to beat the market using material inside
information.
Why in this case is an insider who trades while in possession of
material nonpublic information unable to use such information to beat the
market? The reason is as follows: The irrevocable instructions or binding
contract used by the insider to qualify for the safe harbor prevent her from
abstaining from a trade when material nonpublic information indicates that
the trade is unfavorable. In a regime where insiders are able to abstain but
not trade while aware of material nonpublic information, the expected cost
to an insider of being unable to proceed with a trade after receiving material
nonpublic information indicating that the trade would be favorable equals
the expected benefit from being able to abstain on such information.
Because the expected cost associated with required trade cancellations
offsets the expected benefit associated with self-interested trade
cancellations, insiders under such a regime cannot expect to outperform
public shareholders using material inside information.
By allowing insiders to trade while in possession of material nonpublic
information, the safe harbor eliminates the expected cost to insiders
associated with required trade cancellations. All else equal, eliminating this
cost would enable insiders to beat the market.
But because the insiders have entered the safe harbor through the use of
irrevocable instructions or a binding contract, everything else is not equal.
In particular, the irrevocable instructions or binding contract prevent
insiders from abstaining on material nonpublic information. Thus, what the
safe harbor gives insiders by eliminating the expected cost associated
with required trade cancellations, irrevocable instructions or binding
contracts take away by eliminating the expected benefit associated with
self-interested trade cancellations. As a result, insiders using irrevocable
instructions or binding contracts to enter the safe harbor are no better off
than under a regime where insiders can abstain but not trade while in
possession of nonpublic information.
In essence, the regime created when an insider uses irrevocable
instructions or a binding contract to enter the safe harbor is the mirror
image of Rule lOb-5. Rule lOb-5, according to the SEC, does not allow an
insider to trade while aware of material nonpublic information but permits
the insider to abstain on such information. This safe harbor regime permits
the insider to trade while aware of material nonpublic information (as long
as the trade is effected pursuant to irrevocable instructions or a binding
agreement) but does not permit the insider to abstain from trading by
canceling the intended trade. In either case, an insider cannot expect to beat
the market using material nonpublic information.
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2. Trades Pursuant to a Prearranged Plan
Let us now consider the distributional effects of the SEC's safe harbor
when an insider trades according to a prearranged plan. As noted earlier, the
SEC permits insiders to cancel their prearranged plans while in possession
of material nonpublic information. As I explain, insiders' ability to trade
while in possession of material nonpublic information when the trade is
made pursuant to a prearranged plan, combined with the ability to cancel
the trading plan while in possession of nonpublic information, enables
insiders to outperform the market using material nonpublic information.
Returning again to Section III.C's analytical framework, suppose that
CEO, lacking material inside information bearing on the value of ABC's
shares, commits to selling shares according to a prearranged plan. The
proceeds of the sale are to be invested in a market-wide index fund.
Suppose further that after CEO creates this trading plan but before any
planned trade occurs, CEO learns material nonpublic information bearing
on the value of ABC shares.
If CEO learns material nonpublic information indicating that ABC will
outperform the market, CEO can cancel the prearranged trading plan before
the planned sale and retain the shares until the good news emerges. During
this period, CEO expects to earn a return of M+ x on the shares.
If, on the other hand, CEO learns material nonpublic information
indicating that ABC will underperfortr the market, CEO can enjoy the
benefit of the safe harbor: The subsequent sale of ABC stock according to
the prearranged plan does not create Rule IOb-5 liability for CEO, even
though CEO trades while in possession of material nonpublic information
bearing on the value of those shares. CEO then invests the proceeds of the
sale in the market-wide index fund and expects to earn the market return,
M, during the subsequent period.
TABLE 11. SALE PURSUANT TO PREARRANGED PLAN
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 11!3: 455
Insider Abstention
In Section III.C, we assumed that there is a probability p that ABC will
outperform the market. Thus CEO's expected return, as of the time she
creates the prearranged plan, is M + px, which exceeds the expected market
return. This result should not be surprising. As Subsection III.C.3 showed,
if an insider can both trade while in possession of nonpublic information
and abstain on such information, she will on average outperform the market
and public shareholders.
To the extent the SEC wishes to prevent insiders from profiting from
their access to material nonpublic information, permitting them to cancel
prearranged trading plans while aware of such information does not serve
this objective. To be sure, there is probably a limit to an insider's ability to
abstain on material nonpublic information within the SEC's safe harbor.
Presumably, an insider who cancels trading plans repeatedly would lose the
benefit of the safe harbor.
But there seems to be little cost (in terms of inconvenience to insiders)
to requiring insiders wishing to avail themselves of the safe harbor through
the use of prearranged trading plans to wait until they are unaware of
material nonpublic information before canceling their trading plans. Most
plans involve selling small amounts of shares on a regular basis.
Accordingly, there should be few liquidity or diversification costs to
preventing insiders from canceling prearranged trades when they have
information indicating that the trades would be unfavorable. To the extent a
more level playing field between insiders and public shareholders is
68
desired, such a waiting requirement might therefore be worth adopting.
V. CONCLUSION
Scholars writing on insider trading have long believed that insiders can
beat the market simply by using nonpublic information to decide when not
to trade. Using a simple model, this Essay has shown that the conventional
wisdom is wrong. Insiders prevented from trading while in possession of
nonpublic information cannot outperform public shareholders, even if they
can use such information to abstain from trading. In fact, insiders unable to
trade or abstain while in possession of nonpublic information would
systematically earn lower trading profits than public shareholders.
The Essay has also offered a preliminary analysis of the effects of
insider abstention on managers' incentives. It explained why insider
68. As discussed in Section III.E, insider abstention by managers may well provide efficiency
benefits by better aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. In particular, enabling
managers to abstain from selling on good news allows them to profit fully from the value that they
create for shareholders, increasing their incentives to generate such value. Preventing managers
from canceling prearranged sales might reduce any such benefits. This potential cost should be
considered in determining the desirability of reversing the SEC's position.
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abstention is unlikely to create the same types of potential distortions as
insider trading. Indeed, insider abstention tends to align managers' interests
with those of shareholders, and is therefore likely to improve managers'
incentives.
This Essay's analysis has important implications for current issues in
insider trading regulation. First, the analysis contributes to the "possession
versus use" debate by demonstrating that the "possession" standard for Rule
lOb-5 liability achieves greater parity between insiders and outsiders than
does the "use" standard. Second, the SEC's safe harbor permitting insiders
to buy or sell shares pursuant to prearranged trading plans while in
possession of material nonpublic information and to cancel the plans while
aware of material nonpublic information enables insiders to profit from
their access to such information. The SEC could easily eliminate insiders'
advantages over public shareholders by not allowing insiders to cancel their
plans after becoming aware of material nonpublic information.
More fundamentally, the analysis calls for reconsideration of
established positions in the larger debate over insider trading. This Essay
has shown that the failure of Rule 1Ob-5 to prevent insiders from using
nonpublic information to abstain from trading should be seen neither as an
undesirable "loophole" that needs to be closed nor as an embarrassing gap
that proves the futility of insider trading regulation. I hope this work
removes the shadow cast by insider abstention over the insider trading
debate and helps refocus attention on the most important policy issue: the
optimal regulation of insider trading.
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